Three recent reports – one by the British Foreign Office, one by Vladimir Petrov (former Russian spy who defected in Australia last year), and one by the Australian Royal Commission which investigated the Petrov disclosures — shed much light on communist espionage in general, and the case of Burgess and MacLean (the 'missing diplomats') in particular.
Petrov's disclosures reveal that:
• The main business of Red embassies and diplomatic relations (besides spreading communist propaganda and furthering the Red psychological war) is the organizing and directing of espionage networks, and, where necessary, the directing and supplying of weapons for assassination.
• Embassies are most valuable for espionage purposes because of the "diplomatic immunity enjoyed by Red personnel which places them beyond the law of the country in which they operate, and because of the 'diplomatic' communication channels thus put at their command.
• Many members of the swollen Red embassy staffs are actually Red spymasters and MVD agents. Petrov himself, while ostensibly a clerk in the Canberra embassy, was in reality a senior MVD officer; and he lists no less than 9 other MVD agents who were, outwardly, members of the Soviet Embassy staff.
• The Soviet news agency, Tass, is also a cover for Red espionage. He states that ALL Tass representatives in Australia were active MVD cadre workers "who could (therefore), without exciting attention, mix freely with journalists."
• Friendship and good-will exhibited towards Russia by other nations is exploited to increase Red espionage.
Inasmuch as Red 'diplomatic facilities' mean Red espionage facilities, 'recognition' of further Red regimes cannot be in our best interest.
So long as the Pearson coterie, without successfully refuting the above statement and the solid foundation of fact and logic in which it is rooted, continue to press for the 'recognition' of Red China, their action is highly suspicious.
The following is a brief background of the British diplomats, Burgess and MacLean, who in 1951 fled behind the Iron Curtain:
•Both were recruited to the communist conspiracy while students at leading universities.
• The British Foreign Ministry knew of their college bacgkround, and that the conduct of both, while in the service, had on occasion been unsatisfactory (sexual perversion in at least one of the cases). Yet they were entrusted with key posts.
• Maclean was actually suspected of espionage and under investigation prior to his escape, which makes even more incredible London's lack of security precautions.
Donald MacLean, who occupied the important American Desk in the British Foreign Ministry and handled the most secret cables, information and policy decisions, and Guy Burgess, who held a key post in the British Office in Washington, may have done infinitely more damage to the West than Klaus Fuchs who betrayed our atomic secrets.
It is charged in Washington that in early November of 1950, with North Korean Red armies defeated and the war won, this situation obtained:
Large Red Chinese armies across the Yalu River were in position to enter the Korean war. But if America were to retaliate with her full striking power, Chinese armies would be annihilated, communications and transportation destroyed, and Chinese industry smashed.
Coupled with this, U.S. support of Chiang Kaishek's nationalist forces would enable them to return to the mainland and spark a counter-revolution.
Red China dare not enter the Korean war unless — unless she chould be sure that the U.S. would NOT take decisive counter action!
Britain, India, and other UN members, had been pressing Washington to limit action to Korea and pursue a soft policy towards Red China. Washington, overriding MacArthur's counsel, agreed, and this information was immediately passed by MacLean to the Reds. Assured that they could attack with immunity from their own privileged sanctuary while the UN tied the hands of US field commanders and airpower, Peiping launched its attack.
Gen. James Van Fleet, former US Eighth Army Commander in Korea, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1954:
Q.: Do you believe that the Chinese Communists would have crossed the Yalu without assurance that our military action would be limited?
A.: No; he (the enemy) would not have entered Korea if he did not feel safe from attack in North China and Manchuria...
...My own conviction is that there must have been information to the enemy that we would not attack his home bases.
GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, in a letter to Senator Byrd, April '53, said:
...By one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our military forces within their own area.
LIEUT. GEN. EDWARD M. ALMOND, Commander, X Corps, US Army, Korea, testified before the US Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Nov. 23, 1954;.
...The things as they happened looked very strange insofar as the assurance with which the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been a very hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant numbers in which they did if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to attack.
Peiping, says a Washington report, was so sure of itself that it did not bother even to black out the rail and highway bridges over the Yalu at night as supplies poured in from Manchuria.
And so two men, already suspected of espionage, played their part in turning a war already won into a bloody stalemate, more than quadrupling Western casualties, and setting the stage for further Red aggression.
And as our secrets were stolen and this tragedy enacted, far too many snickering idiots in our press, radio and politics were telling us that the threat to our security came from the 'witchhunters' who were too stern in their efforts to root out subversives!
And, judging by the disastrous policies of the West from Yalta to Geneva, the exposure of espionage and treason in high places — in Washington, London, and Ottawa — has yet barely scratched the surface.